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INTRODUCTION
“I believe we can do better.”
Donald T. Nicolaisen, Chief Accountant, US Securities & Exchange Commission1
The ethical and financial disasters of Enron, Worldcom, and others put a huge dent in the 
trustworthiness of  public corporations.  After these very expensive and morally troubling 
debacles, public focus and government attention turned quickly to reforming corporate 
governance, with special emphasis on enhanced monitoring of corporate insiders, the directors 
and the managers, by outsiders, the accountants and the lawyers.  The Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Corporate Responsibility chapter of the United States Code2, commonly 
known as Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, (SOX), represents the culmination of Congressional 
efforts to curb corporate malfeasance, and contains provisions addressing the conduct of just 
about everybody playing a part in the corporate enterprise.  SOX does not merely promulgate 
new rules, however.   It  also delegates greater powers to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to do so.3
1
 Jay Seliber, John W. White, Accounting Disclosure Practice, 1455 PLI/Corp. 125 
(WEST 2004).
2
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (enacted),  is named for its 
sponsors, senator Paul Sarbanes from Maryland, and congressman Michael Oxley from Ohio.  
The unofficial version of the Act can be found at 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7201 et seq. (LEXIS 2005).
3
 Id.
2Up to date, the SEC is still figuring out exactly how best to translate the mandate of Congress 
into practical reforms.  Most notably, the SEC is exploring ways to redesign standards of 
professional responsibility for attorneys practicing before the Commission. 4
This paper explores the relationships among the SEC, the lawyers, the public 
corporations, and the public in light of these recent scandals and reforms. The discussion will 
focus on the new rules for attorneys practicing before the SEC.  This paper consists of two parts.  
The first part of the paper contains brief summaries of SOX, the rules of professional 
responsibility issued by the SEC, the changes in the Model Rules, and the changes in standards 
of liability for attorneys, interspersed with various suggestions for additional changes, and views 
on the new rules from renowned practitioners in the field of securities.5  The second part of the 
paper reviews some theories explaining the downfall of Enron in order to ground the discussion 
of what had prompted recent reforms in the structure and governance of public corporations.
INTRODUCING THE LAWYERS
This paper contains views from four distinguished securities lawyers.  In alphabetical 
order, Ed Ellers is an adjunct professor at Temple Law School.  He teaches securities, gaming 
law, and various corporate transactional classes.  He is a partner at Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, 
4
 The Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm (accessed 
February 15, 2005) (adopting final rules, with explanations, and extending the comment period 
for some provisions) [hereinafter SEC Release].  Plain text of the rule is codified as 17 C.F.R. § 
205 et seq. (LEXIS 2005) [hereinafter Rule 205]. 
5
 Originally, this paper also planned to include views from the SEC.  However, “the staff 
[of the SEC] is not permitted to publicly opine on the views of the Commission.”  Email from 
Carol Rosenblat, Atty., SEC’s Philadelphia office to Olga Yevglevsakaya-Wayne, student, 
Temple Law School, Sarbanes-Oxley (Apr. 26, 2005, 4:59 p.m. EDT).
3Branzburg. & Ellers, a former attorney at the SEC, and a founder of his own public company.  
He is extensively experienced in diverse securities and corporate law issues. 
Justin Klein is a partner-in-charge of the Securities Group at the Philadelphia office of 
Ballard Sparh, Andrews & Ingersoll.  He served for over nine years at the SEC, and was also a 
court appointed trustee in SEC enforcement matters.  Mr. Klein has chaired various Bar 
Association committees related to securities law, and is an appointee to the Attorney Advisory 
Committee of The Pennsylvania Securities Commission.
Jason Shargel is a partner at Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, in the 
Corporate/Securities practice group.  He too is a former attorney at the SEC.  He worked for the 
Commission’s Enforcement Division right after law school.  He is a member of the Pennsylvania 
Bar Association and represents public and private clients in a wide variety of corporate and 
securities matters. 
Carl Schneider is Of Counsel at Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, where he was 
partner since 1965, and  Chair of the Corporate Law Department.  He is a former Special 
Advisor to the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance.  He is widely published in securities and 
corporate law matters, and lectures on these subjects at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School.  Mr. Schneider is one of  The Best Lawyers in America, according to Who's Who in 
America.  He is considered an icon by his colleagues. 
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I. NEW LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND RULES WITH COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS
A. Overview of SOX
SOX, signed into law in 2002, contains eleven titles mandating new standards in 
corporate law.6  First, the Act calls for the establishment of a Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) to set up quality controls and oversee accounting practices of all 
publicly traded companies.7  Second, the Act designates standards for independence of financial 
auditors from the companies they review.8  The third title, aptly named Corporate Responsibility, 
6
 H.R. 3763 §§ 1-1107.
7 Id. §§ 101-109.  By November 2004, large companies were for the first time required to 
submit the initial report assessing internal quality controls over financial reporting under the new 
standards set by the PCAOB; by July 2005, small companies must follow suit.  1455 PLI/Corp. 
125.
5defines various standards of practice for corporate directors and officers, audit committees, and 
even attorneys.9  In addition to section 305, which allows the SEC to ban particular individuals 
from serving as directors or managers of public companies,10 this title contains the much-debated 
section 307, which prescribes minimum standards of professional responsibility for attorneys 
practicing before the SEC, and grants the SEC authority to do the same on a more specific 
level.11  Under section 307, attorneys privy to material violations of state or federal laws by 
anyone within the company are first required to report their knowledge to the company’s Chief 
Legal Officer (CLO), or chief executive officer (CEO), or an equivalent.12  The next part of this 
paper  reviews the latest SEC rules adopted pursuant to section 307.
Title IV of SOX provides for more timely and detailed financial disclosures, requiring, 
for example, certain transactions by corporate insiders owning more then ten percent of the 
company’s stock to be publicly disclosed within two business days.13  Section 404,14 the so-
8
 H.R. 3763 §§ 201-209.
9 Id. §§ 301-308.
10
 Described as “[perhaps] the most significant remedy under the Act.”  Thomas O. 
Gorman & Heather J. Steward, Is There A New Sheriff in Corporateville? The Obligations of 
Directors, Officers, Accountants, and Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley of 2002, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 
135, 159 (Winter 2004) [hereinafter New Sheriff in Corporateville].
11
 Section 307.
12
 Id.
13
 H.R. 3763 §§ 401-409. Presumably, this will function an alarm bell for investors: if the 
insider of a company begins to sell off his ownership share–he probably knows something (bad) 
that the outsiders do not.  For example, Kenneth Lay, founder, chairman, and CEO of Enron, 
sold most of his Enron holdings in 2001, and did not disclose the fact to the public.  Faith 
Stevelman Kahn, What Are the Ways of Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility? Bombing 
Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 Tul. 
L. Rev. 1579, 1595 (2002) [hereinafter Bombing Markets].  Recent news, however, indicate that 
this provision of SOX left at least some loopholes.  Soon after Merck took Vioxx, one if its 
6called “internal controls” provision, delegates authority to the SEC to promulgate rules regarding 
mandatory control mechanisms for quality financial reporting within public companies, as well 
as disclosures of these mechanisms.  Another section of Title IV requires disclosure of whether 
the company has its own code of ethics, and if not, the reasons for its failure to adopt one.15
Title V, containing a single section, addresses the “treatment of securities analysts by 
registered securities associations and national securities exchanges.”16  Title VI broadens the 
power, both legal and financial, delegated to the SEC.17  Title VII provides for specific studies 
and reports on the activities of public accounting firms, credit rating agencies, and investment 
banks.18  Section 703 authorizes a study of violations of federal securities laws that took place 
during the period from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2001.19  Section 703 also specifies that 
“a report based upon the [Section 703] study... shall be submitted to the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House 
major drugs, off the market in 2004, company CEO Raymond V. Gilmartin “realized” $ 34.8 
million from his stock option compensation scheme.  Although this total amount was calculated 
based on the publicly disclosed difference between the company’s stock price and the price of 
the option, it was not disclosed whether Mr. Gilmartin, had, in fact, exercised the option and 
actually sold the stock.  Associated Press, Update 1: Merck CEO Realized $ 34.8M in 2004 
Options,  http://www.forbes.com/associatedpress/feeds/ap/2005/03/10/ap1877728.html (accessed 
Mar. 10, 2005). 
14
 H.R. 3763 § 404.
15 Id. § 406. This provision “will practically guarantee that issuers will actually adopt 
such codes.”  New Sheriff in Corporateville at 149.  “A ‘code of ethics’ is defined to mean 
standards that will promote honest and ethical conduct, full and fair disclosure in periodic filings, 
and compliance with government regulations.”  Id.
16
 H.R. 3763 § 501.
17 Id. §§ 601-604.
18 Id. §§ 701-705. 
19 Id. § 703. 
7of Representatives... .”20  Other studies related to understanding the effectiveness of various 
reforms of accounting principles are authorized throughout the Act.21  However, no studies of 
violations of federal or state laws by corporations at any future time are specified. 
Titles VIII-IX and XI of SOX deal with criminal accountability and penalties for various 
violations of securities and other laws.22  Title X requires Chief Executive Officers to sign 
corporate tax returns.23  This provision will presumably bar CEOs in the future from pleading 
ignorance of what had gone wrong during potential future investigations.24
Mr. Klein calls SOX “Full Time Employment Act for Securities Lawyers.”  SOX 
requires more care and more process by public companies, who must also keep up with new 
rules promulgated by the SEC, the states, and the stock exchanges.  Also, SOX has ushered a 
change in attitude by public companies, who are very concerned about compliance and liability.  
Mr. Klein points out that SOX has made it much easier for lawyers to give advice to and 
persuade corporate clients because of these new concerns, and that clients are more welcoming 
of lawyers, inviting them to board meetings, for example, which was very rare in the past. 
20 Id. 
21 See discussion in Lawrence A. Cunningham, Symposium: Crisis in Confidence: 
Corporate Governance and Professional Ethics Post Enron Sponsored by Wiggin & Dana: The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 Conn. L. 
Rev. 915, 917-918 (2003) [hereinafter Crisis in Confidence].
22
 H.R. 3763 §§ 801-906; 1101-1107.
23 Id. § 1001. 
24 New Sheriff in Corporateville at 137.  The Act focuses a great deal on personal
accountability of corporate insiders and outsiders.  Id. at 138.  “Intent of [various section of 
SOX] is clear–to bring a new ethical standard to the marketplace by forcing corporate executives 
to take responsibility for the financial information published by their companies.”  Id. at 156.
8Mr. Klein finds the internal controls Section 404 of SOX has been most demanding in 
terms of implementation.  Section 402, a prohibition on short term loans to corporate officers, 
has been most “asinine.”  Also, the emphasis on auditor independence has had a chilling effect 
on the ability of public companies to get informal advice about various transactions from their 
auditors; that is, auditors are reluctant to act as sounding boards for various transactions 
contemplated by companies employing them, due to fear of liability. 
Mr. Klein notes that deadlines for many disclosures have shortened, a reform 
contemplated years before Enron and SOX.  Securities has always been a more risky legal 
practice, according to law firms’ insurance carriers.  “It is risky to represent people who raise 
money from other people,” says Mr. Klein.   He adds that tightening of the rules has made it even 
more risky. 
Law firms have certainly responded to SOX, Mr. Klein adds.  In addition to intra-firm 
educational initiatives, there is a “cottage industry” of law firm memos related to SOX on the 
internet, and circulating among various law firms.  At least in Philadelphia, lawyers at various 
firms form a “friendly, collegial network,” and actively share opinions on the optimal 
implementation of SOX.  
Mr. Shargel seconds this response. There is a great deal of awareness-raising initiatives 
within and among law firms regarding the new rules and regulations.  Corporate managers and 
directors are definitely more concerned about understanding and properly adhering to the new 
regulations, which has caused a greater dependence on lawyers, and has correspondingly 
enhanced the lawyers’ influence over their clients.  Lawyers are giving more advice about how 
corporate boards must meet their obligations to the shareholders, and companies listen carefully.
9Mr. Shargel notes that although the process of implementing some changes, such as 
Section 404 internal controls, has been “expensive and muddled”, much of it is a one-time deal, 
which will not be too difficult to update.  Redrawing audit committee charters and setting up  
codes of ethics, for example, need only be done once.  On the other hand, complying with 
enhanced conflict of interest provisions, such as restrictions on short-term loans to corporate 
officers, will require more tweaking.  The SEC does not define the term “loan,” for example, and 
in practice, the term is ambiguous, raising a disproportionate number of issues compared to the 
policy behind this rule, which is hard to discern in the first place.  
Mr. Schneider notes that SOX and associated reforms have signaled a change in focus by 
corporations.  Attention and care is heeded to such items as executive compensation packages 
and other similar perks and benefits to corporate employees.  It is no longer acceptable to charge 
a manager’s wife’s birthday party as a company expense, for example, although this kind of 
issue was hardly material in the past.  Sensitivity to these kinds of maters is coming to the fore. 
Mr. Schneider agrees that implementing internal controls, under Section 404, has been 
challenging for public companies and for lawyers.  Rules promulgated pursuant to this provision 
of SOX are brand new and very time consuming.  Forcing corporate executives to take personal 
responsibility for various disclosures is another novel change. 
Mr. Ellers lauds the establishment of the PCAOB as one of the most important and 
meaningful provisions of SOX.  He says that new rules for accountants and corporate officers, 
though not lawyers,  are rightfully the first line of defense against fraud. 
One academic criticism of SOX is that while it thoroughly addresses conflicts of interest 
between various corporate actors, it ultimately fails to recalibrate incentives for people to act in 
10
ways that will actually deter fraud and malfeasance.25  At the same time, SOX is lauded for 
introducing a shift from rule-based to principle-based actions.26  That is, instead of dictating the 
precise course of action for various corporate actors to follow, SOX seeks to motivate corporate 
actors to be guided by context-specific judgments adding up to standards of objective 
reasonableness and fairness.  Where Congress has left off, the SEC has picked up the struggle to 
promote healthy corporate practices. 
B. Latest for Lawyers from the SEC: Rule 205.
The SEC has opined that “by passing [SOX], Congress has implicitly concluded that the 
benefits of setting minimum federal standards [of professional responsibility for attorneys 
practicing before the Commission] justify their costs.”27
1. Rule 205, the Basics
After rounds of arguments between government administrators, corporate officers and 
attorneys of all kinds, the SEC promulgated “final” rules “prescribing minimum standards of 
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before [the Commission].”28  The 
highlight of the rules is a mandatory reporting “up the ladder”29
25
 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeping Failure and Reform, The Challenge of Fashioning 
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301 (2004) [hereinafter Gatekeeping Failure].
26
 Id.
27
 SEC Release, § IV. Costs and Benefits.
28
 SEC Release, § I. Executive Summary.
29
 SEC Release, § II. Section-by-Section Discussion of the Final Rule.  
Federal securities laws consist of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, SOX, the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Securities Investor 
Protection Act of 1970.  New Sheriff in Corporateville at 139-140.  
11
requirement, triggered when an attorney becomes aware of objective evidence of material 
violations of federal or state securities laws by the issuer or its constituents.  In elaborating the 
meaning of both “evidence” and “material,” the SEC notes that the reporting requirement is only 
activated when the violative conduct on the part of the issuer or its constituents is fairly 
egregious, not merely questionable.30  In view of the SEC, “material” is a legal term with a clear 
and well-established meaning.31
“Up the ladder” reporting begins when an outside counsel becomes aware of objective 
evidence of material violations of state or federal laws and relays this information to the 
company’s CLO, or its CLO and CEO, or its Qualified Legal Compliance Committee (QLCC).32
The QLCC is a special, independent committee within the company, set up at the company’s 
option for the specific purpose or receiving reports about potential wrongdoings and 
recommending a course of action to the managers of the company.33  The outside counsel 
making the report is aptly called the reporting attorney.  Reporting is called “up the ladder” 
because when the initial report does not affect a remedy, the reporting attorney must relay the 
information to more senior company management, and then to the board of directors.34
30
 SEC Release, § II.
31 Id.
32 Id; see Albert S. Dandridge, III, Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Regarding 
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, in Two Years of Sarbanes-Oxley: Real Reform 
or Window Dressing? 441-446 (Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2004).
33
 SEC Release, § II. 
34 Id. 
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The SEC notes its intent to not disrupt traditional corporate governance (created by state 
law 35) by not empowering the receiver and investigator of the initial complaint from the 
reporting attorney to authorize the company to take action.36  Although the QLCC is technically 
a new, federally-created branch of corporate government, either it, or the CLO is empowered 
only to  recommend the proper course of action in response to the complaint, and not to direct its 
implementation.37  Ultimately, company managers, people traditionally empowered to run daily 
corporate affairs,38 must decide whether to adopt the remedial recommendations of the CLO or 
the QLCC.  
After receiving the initial report from an outside attorney, the CLO or the QLCC must 
investigate it, and then communicate an “appropriate response” to the reporting attorney.39
Essentially, an “appropriate” response is either a cure of the fraud with measures to prevent its 
recurrence, or the hiring of the reporting attorney to review the evidence of violations and assert 
a colorable defense in any investigation or lawsuit of the company or its employees.40  Hiring the 
attorney to assert a colorable defense, however, does not by itself constitute an “appropriate 
35
 See generally James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Haze, Corporations, § 1.02 (Aspen Publ., 
2nd Ed., 2003) [hereinafter Corporations].
36 Id.
37
 Id. 
38 See generally Corporations, §§ 8.01-8.12. 
39
 SEC Release, § II. 
40 Id. This retention of the reporting attorney must be made with the consent of the board 
of directors or a committee consisting of board members, or the QLCC.  Id.
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response.”41  Nor may the company utilize the reporting attorney to conceal violations of law or 
further illegal conduct.42
 In the event the reporting attorney does not receive an “appropriate response” after her 
initial reporting, she must report evidence of material violations of state or federal laws to higher 
authorities within the company.43  The SEC specifically explains its intent that attorneys exercise 
reasonable judgment with respect to both the decision to initiate “up the ladder” reporting and 
the evaluation of “appropriate response,” including the time it took to receive it.44
2. A Note About Reasonable Time
Rule 205 explicitly mandates that at attorney’s choice to report “up and ladder” and her 
review of corporate response is to be evaluated under the standard of objective reasonableness.45
While a principle-based provision, it remains a highly manipulable one absent some grounding in 
time.  Arguably, an “appropriate” response need not follow all that promptly.  In fact, there is no 
incentive for the corporation to respond as promptly as it possibly could.  For example, while 
curing an imminent violation of financial disclosure laws a day late might be an “appropriate” 
enough response to satisfy the attorney’s reporting obligations, that day might nevertheless be 
sufficient to manipulate the market.  This absence of any timing limitations on the nature of 
corporate response, aside from the manipulable concept of reasonableness, opens a wide door not 
only for the perpetuation of some fraud, but also for getting time to hide it, and then, if a lawsuit 
41 Id. 
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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follows, for hiding behind an affirmative defense of appropriate response having been provided 
to the reporting attorney.
Although perhaps curbing major violations, “reasonable” and “appropriate” criteria, not 
grounded in more precise principles of time or some other specification, set up incentives to 
stretch the concepts of reasonableness and propriety to the extent of defeating their very purpose.  
It is true that reasonableness varies with respect to violations of different kind of laws.  It is also 
true, however, that left unchecked, reasonableness could evolve into abused discretion.  Further 
grounding of this concept is needed; time of response is perhaps most relevant.46
Just like there is a market for stock there is a market for law firms.  Clients choose those 
firms that represent their interests best, and public corporations probably have their most 
permissive favorites.  An insufficiently grounded standard of reasonableness creates a 
competition among law firms to be at best most patient, and at worst most inappropriately 
reasonable.  After all, there are not many checks on lawyers, and even fewer incentives for them 
to not accommodate their clients by being satisfied with responses to their reports of barely 
passing grades. This is true especially if whatever damage might be done wouldn’t be too terribly 
bad, because no one will probably find out about it anyway.  Although many lawyers will 
probably resist pressures from their clients to push the limits of reasonableness, the current 
version of the rules regulating conduct of attorneys does not empower lawyers with special 
incentives to do so, aside from a strong sense of ethics.  However, SOX and the rules that 
followed are evidence that ethical principles alone are not enough to prevent wrongdoing.  For 
these reasons, it might be worthwhile to try to set up the rules so that corporate actors do not 
46 But see Timing the Attorney-Client Privilege, infra.
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want to commit any fraud in the fist place, and so that lawyers want and can keep a truly 
independent and watchful eye while serving their clients within reason.  
The drawback of grounding the concept of reasonableness in more precise guidelines 
about the timeliness of the appropriate response, again, is that responses to reports of different 
kinds of misconduct will vary with respect to violations of different kinds of laws.  Different 
kinds of violations have different stakes, and lend themselves differently to remedies.  One could 
go on hypothesizing about the different possibilities where timeliness might or might not matter, 
but the bigger point is that there is not enough information available about the kinds of violations 
that take place in corporations, or about their frequency.  There is also no guarantee lawyers 
themselves appreciate the potential for how their clients might stretch (or might pressure the 
lawyers to stretch) the limits of reasonableness, because, ultimately, the clients are better 
business experts than the lawyers, and they have succeeded in the past in diluting the 
watchfulness of lawyers.  Without some “industry custom,” some understanding of what really 
goes on, it will probably be difficult for courts potentially reviewing lawyers’ reporting and 
corporate responses to fairly and consistently adjudicate these issues of reasonableness and 
propriety.  Most likely, as between corporate lawyers, their clients, and the courts, judges are 
least well versed in business dealings, perhaps with the exception of judges on the Delaware 
Chancery Court.
16
But establishing an industry custom of attorney-client monitoring is easier 
suggested than done.  The lawyer’s reporting obligation stops when she receives an 
appropriate response: this event signals the end of the problem.  The downside of this 
process is that some potentially very valuable information is never disclosed.  The upside 
is that working out problems on the inside does not involve disclosure of privileged 
information.  It must be noted, however, that overall, the general trend in law today is in 
the direction of an eroding attorney-client privilege, particularly in the business context.47
Mr. Ellers comments that the way to go about reform is to punish the Boards of 
Directors, not to attack the attorney-client privilege.  “If anybody is in privity with the 
SEC, it is the Board.”
The real issue behind reporting obligations is who the client is, and to whom and 
by whom obligations are owed.  Most commonly, it is the Board who hires the outside 
attorney, and his obligations are to the company by way of the Board of Directors.  
Boards make critical judgments at the highest level, and they are the ones who ought to 
be reprimanded for misconduct, not the lawyers.  In part, SOX recognizes this because 
many of its provisions are aimed at enhancing accountability of corporate officers. 
The reason lawyers are not the best line of defense against fraud, Mr. Ellers 
explains, is because they are not always in the best position to evaluate or obtain all the 
47
 Molly McDonough, Flying Under the Radar: After Percolating Quietly, These 
Legal Issues may Grab Headlines in 2005, 91 ABA J. 34 (Jan. 2005).  Rule 205 itself is a 
major part of this trend.  It does not require client consent as a predicate of an attorney 
being permitted to report privileged information to the SEC when other requisite 
conditions are met.  Sarah Plotkin Paul, Dawn Raids Here at Home? The Danger of 
Vanishing Privacy Expectations for Corporate Employees, 17 St. Thomas L. Rev. 265 
(2004).  Aside from changes in attorney-client privilege, there are other reasons the 
expectation of privacy of intra-corporate communications is eroding in this age of 
computers and electronic communications.  Id.
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information that is needed to evaluate the overall integrity of a corporate client.  Again, 
whom they represent and for what purpose matters a great deal.  Outside lawyers are 
hired for specific projects, and their access to information, as well as their duties to 
become informed are defined by the nature of the task for which they are retained.  
Lawyers have no subpoena power, or enforcement/investigation power of any kind.  
What is reasonable conduct by a company overall is not always clear, but burdening 
lawyers with any excess reporting or monitoring obligations puts them in a position 
where they are not motivated to obtain as much information about a client as they can to 
provide the best advice to the client, for fear of incurring a duty to blow the whistle.  The 
‘if I look too hard I must disclose, so I better not look too hard’ practical implication of 
making lawyers accountable is not helping anybody.  Also, it is not always clear what 
exactly terms like “objective evidence” or “material violations” mean.  Making lawyers 
pay for the fraud also makes legal charges increase, and this is ultimately a cost borne by 
the shareholders.  Overall, Mr. Ellers is troubled by the approach of making lawyers a 
part of the solution, as opposed to other professionals, such as accountants.  
Mr. Ellers contrasts his views with those of former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt.  
Mr. Pitt believed that lawyers’ obligations are essentially to the shareholders and to the 
public at large; that the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context is largely 
irrelevant because ultimately, the shareholders are the true clients possessing an inherent 
right to be informed about what management does. 
Mr. Ellers disagrees.  He argues the Boards of Directors are the best proxies for 
personifying the representation of corporate entities.  He suggests that shareholders have 
a right to hire their own lawyers, and to demand information about internal company 
18
operations when they are concerned about wrongdoing.  Mr. Ellers points out that larger 
public companies are owned in substantial part by sophisticated institutional investors 
who are well versed in obtaining all kinds of information about companies in which they 
invest.  In reality, institutional investors have their own lawyers, and corporate law allows 
them to make demands for information. Those who invest large sums of money into 
public corporations go to great lengths to obtain a great deal of information about them.
Mr. Ellers uses Enron as an example.  He says that sophisticated investors knew 
well in advance about many of the problems with the company.  And, the shareholders 
were the ones who pressured companies to keep stock prices high by any means 
necessary in order for the value of shareholders’ assets to stay at high levels.  
“Sometimes, shareholders don’t want to know bad news; they don’t want to be 
protected.”  Sometimes, they must admit their own role in the problems.
Mr. Shargel takes a slightly different view.  First, he notes the good news: in the 
real world, corporate clients will listen when lawyers advise them about the illegality of 
certain types of conduct.  Although there does exist a level of general discomfort about 
lawyers imposing their judgment and questioning that of corporate officers, lawyers do 
stay well-attuned to where the law draws lines, and the majority of them do not turn a 
blind eye to situations when clients may wish to cross them.  “People do not push the 
boundary if they are told they are over the line.”  And, once again, the general level of 
awareness is quite high in today’s corporate environment.  
The lawyers are the gatekeepers, says Mr. Shargel, and accountability is 
important. Although corporate clients are sometimes personified as particular corporate 
19
officers because these are the people with whom lawyers deal on a day-to-day basis, 
lawyers can and do remember their obligations to the corporate entity overall.  
Mr. Shargel asserts that reporting “up the ladder” is an appropriate solution to the 
recent wave of corporate scandals, and, that it is consistent with the notion of serving the 
best interest of the corporation as the client.  The idea behind this regulation is to promote 
internal solutions to problems, without imposing on the attorney-client privilege by way 
of mandating or even permitting disclosures of confidential information.  In reality, the 
vast majority of problems will most likely be fixed before or at the level of bringing some 
problem to the attention of the Board of Directors.  
Mr. Shargel admits there is a level of ambiguity associated with terms such as 
“material” or “reasonable.”  These terms are “absolutely not completely clear.”  He says, 
however, that overall, the SEC did as good of a job defining these terms as it could, and it 
is the lawyers’ task, after all, to deal with ambiguity. 
“I spend twelve hours a day worrying about shades of grey,” says Mr. Klein, who 
explains that interpreting the meaning of words that are less then absolutely clear is 
precisely the job of the lawyer, who uses his judgment and experience to come up with 
answers.  “What is material and not is all over the place.”  There is a quantitative as well 
as a qualitative component to these terms.  But, the day of a securities lawyer is spent 
figuring these things out and advising clients about what must be and what need not be 
disclosed.  Part of the problem is figuring out what the SEC wants, and reading the dinner 
speeches may be as important as reading the rules. 
Mr. Klein agrees with Mr. Shargel that lately clients are more receptive to 
lawyers’ advice.  “Everybody is rolling in the same direction here.”  Mr. Klein also 
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agrees that lawyers represent corporations as separate entities, no matter whom the 
lawyers deal with on a daily basis.  “You have to be sensitive to situations,” says Mr. 
Klein, “admittedly, there are situations of conflict, a management buyout is an example.  
Sometimes, you do question the CEO’s authority, but not often.”
On the issue of representing corporate clients, Mr. Klein adds that law firms have 
the power to select and fire clients just like clients have this power over lawyers.  
Lawyers try to pick clients with whom they can establish an honest rapport, avoiding 
those who are likely to get everyone in trouble.  There have been times, says Mr. Klein, 
when clients have been fired, not because they violated the law, but because the lawyers 
were uncomfortable with them. 
Mr. Schneider describes materiality as a judgment call, which is in part economic.  
What is immaterial to a billion dollar company may be material to a smaller one.  
“Materiality is not just a numbers test, is also has to do with what the issue is.”
Lawyers must make judgments regarding less then clear terms.  Generally, this 
task is handled well, but it is very important “to be clear about what matter that you are 
working on. You don’t want to make representations that go beyond the issue of your 
engagement.”
Mr. Schneider explains that when outside lawyers are retained by corporations, 
they are often retained for a specific, delineated purpose.  Most companies are not in a 
position to do all of their work internally, they need a lot of expertise.  But, just because a 
lawyer is employed by a company, does not mean he is in a position to evaluate 
materiality of certain items, if that is not the job for which he is hired.  “You know only 
so much as you need to know for one dispute, one contract, one regional issue.  When 
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auditors write to you, there is tension in what you can answer because you were only 
engaged in project X, and you don’t know much about [the company’s] disclosures or 
accounting.”  Thus, when outside lawyers have obligations as watchdogs, matters may 
get complicated.
Mr. Schneider explains that generally, lawyers have incentives to be cautious in 
their judgment calls because they do not want to be second-guessed.  The current 
regulatory environment has “put the lawyers in a frame of reference where they don’t 
want to make hard judgments.  They have to ask questions, but they may be acting self-
protectively.  It gives them a lot of incentive to be less then vigorous advocates.”
Yet, Mr. Schneider admits that he does not have personal objections to the way 
the balance has ultimately been struck.  “When the screws are tightened, there are a lot of 
squeals.” 
Mr. Schneider explains that a lawyer simply cannot watch a client do something 
significantly illegal and say nothing about it. “You can’t just sit still. The role of 
counselor is not to help the client do something illegal.  A lawyer must become 
convinced that what is going on is ok, and be prepared to defend that judgment, 
[although] in the real world, judgments can get very close.  The professionals are under 
enormous scrutiny.”  The right to practice law is on the line, and this is not to be taken 
lightly.  Lawyers do serve as gatekeepers.
Mr. Schneider also reminds lawyers they have to remember that they represent the 
corporation as a whole, not its individual officers or directors.  It is true that daily 
contacts are with the CEO or with another executive, “but you really have to make it very 
clear to the CEO that you are representing the company, not him personally.  If there are 
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things questioning the CEO’s performance, you [must] advise him to have his own 
lawyer....  You have to be extremely sensitive to these situations.”  In practice, when 
there is a lawsuit, because a lawyer initially retained to represent a company has had so 
much contact with a particular executive, he may end up representing him, while the 
company, usually by way of the Board of Directors, hires someone else.  Whom a lawyer 
represents and for what purpose affects his responsibilities and obligations. 
3. Timing the Attorney-Client Privilege
There is yet another possibility.  We need to ask whether  it really matters if 
privileged information about cured misconduct is reported after the statute of limitations 
for suit has expired,48 and, whether it is possible or desirable to have documents about 
reports of violations and curative responses disclosed to the SEC by corporations for 
educational purposes.  It might be useful, for example, to remove the confidential status 
of violations and intra-corporate problems that are old enough to no longer pose a threat 
of fraud on investors, lawsuits by them, or catch-22 situations for lawyers with respect to 
disclosing information when it is still sensitive enough to matter for purposes of the 
market.  
48
 Section 804 of SOX, found at 28 U.S.C.S. § 1658 (LEXIS 2005) provides the 
following: 
[A] private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or 
contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities 
laws, as defined in section 3 (a) (47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . 
may be brought not later than the earlier of --
(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or
(2) 5 years after such violation.
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Five years after the intra-corporate problem requiring “up the ladder” reporting is 
solved, the client is probably employing a different outside law firm.  If corporate clients 
know that facts about past internal problems will eventually become public knowledge, 
they may actually want to rotate its legal representation.  As a result, competition would 
probably diminish among law firms to be most loyal, i.e., most inappropriately 
reasonable. 
Voluntary disclosure of past problems by corporations would allow the SEC or 
another body to review the actions taken in response to internal reports by both lawyers 
and corporations, and to comment on them.  The database of knowledge about most 
recurrent and most pervasive problems could prove  invaluable.  For one, it could 
generate a discussion about reasonableness and propriety that would keep these concept 
from stretching beyond their essential meanings.  Law firms would have this check of 
eventual disclosure to prevent them from acquiescing to the pressures of their clients, a 
task in which they proved unsuccessful leading up to Enron. The disclosed information as 
well as comments on it would provide attorneys with better guidelines about what 
“reasonable” means in different types of circumstances.  Lawyers less skilled in securities 
law, who are nevertheless faced with potentially having to initiate “up the ladder” 
reporting, would actually have some guidance regarding whether or not they must act and 
how they ought to proceed.
Because reasonableness is a malleable concept, in the early stages of collecting 
this data about reasonable responses, both initial reporting and evaluations of corporate 
responses by attorneys will probably vary widely from one set of facts to the next, and 
from one law firm to the next.  Only as more data becomes available could there be some 
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definition to what constitutes a healthy corporate response to problems.  Because 
disclosure would be made after the statute of limitations expires, at least on the federal 
level, disclosure would not threaten suits and their associated costs.  Also, judges 
presiding over investor suits could likewise become better informed about adequate and 
reasonable corporate problem-solving than they probably are at this time.  
Should mandatory ex-post disclosure of internal reports and responses to them be 
adopted, “reasonableness” will no longer need to be grounded in more specific 
descriptions of what a “timely” response means in different kinds of situations.49  In time 
and with more information, reasonableness will be grounded in customary practices and 
comments from those who study them.  How much time it will take to have a sizable 
enough database to constitute a meaningful reference point for what “reasonable” means 
in practice will depend on how much information the SEC will collect, and how soon it 
might collect it, analyze it, and comment on it. 
Another advantage of making past problems part of public knowledge after the 
statute of limitations for lawsuits elapses is that this measure could control the market for 
good managers in ways that ordinary market forces currently cannot.  If good monitoring 
sends signals to the market about effective management,50 the incentives for corporate 
managers to exercise less then good faith in response to reports from attorneys will be 
significantly diminished through a threat of eventual disclosure.  People whose names 
consistently reappear in such disclosures will have a harder time retaining positions of 
power and threatening the public interest.  
49 See A Note About Reasonable Time, supra.
50 See John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal 
Prosecution, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 310 , 400  (2004) [hereinafter Reforming Corporations].
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Even if a hypothetical “up the ladder” report about a fraud which had not yet 
occurred is remedied timely and properly, there are costs associated with an attorney 
initiating such a report.  Although it is appropriate to focus on stamping out fraud before 
it causes injuries, it is likewise appropriate to install measures which dissuade the 
temptation to commit it altogether. 
This kind of disclosure system, because it would not be accompanied by a threat 
of lawsuits given the expired statute of at least federal limitations, may not necessarily 
involve issues of violating the attorney-client privilege.  For one, the burden of disclosure 
could be on the firm, rather then on the lawyer.  Also, lawyers represent corporations, not 
individual officers, and when conduct of particular individuals is at issue, whether the 
privilege attaches to them personally is a question of their authority within the 
corporation.51
Disclosure is costly.  Collection, maintenance, and analysis of information are 
also costly.  On the other hand, companies are the cheapest cost-avoiders52 when it comes 
to providing the public with information that, when analyzed, produces the benefits of 
clear standards for attorneys to follow, and deters corporate officers from walking too 
closely to the edge of the law on repeat occasions. 
The reason managers are traditionally divorced from corporate ownership is to 
encourage them to take risks, leading to greater payoffs for everyone in the long run.  
Arguably, excess disclosure would blunt risk-taking because managers would fear their 
51 See William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer 
Represent? An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 57, 60 (2003) 
[hereinafter Organization’s Lawyer].
52 Reforming Corporations at 413 (Easterbrook/Fishel theory). 
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names appearing anywhere near those reports.  It is a question of policy whether risk-
taking that triggers concerns of lawyers about violations of state or federal laws is the 
kind of risk-taking that is contemplated by this tenet of traditional corporate law. 
Another general argument against “too much” disclosure is that it provides non-
disclosing firms with a competitive advantage.53  When two firms have equal standing on 
the market, and one makes a negative disclosure while the other does not, the more 
forthcoming firm incurs the cost of investor dissatisfaction reflected in the price of its 
shares.54  Mandatory disclosure, however, eliminates this dilemma and because of the 
delay in time between the events and the disclosure, ex-post disclosure may not have any 
effects on the prices of shares at all. 
Certainly issues exist with respect to the form of information delivery and to 
whom it ought to be delivered.  The level of detail contained in these disclosures will 
probably depend on the nature of the problems, and the SEC could fine-tune its 
requirements once it begins to accumulate information.   Presumably, the SEC or a sub-
agency dedicated to studying the practical effects of SOX and its attendant reforms could 
be the recipient of these reports from companies.  SOX does not authorize this directly, 
but the general delegation of authority to the SEC may provide sufficient authority to 
defeat any issues of the SEC’s power to set up such a research agency.  However, it 
would probably be rather useful for states to get involved as well, and to also have an
opportunity to comment on the information received from corporations.  For example, an 
independent commission could be set up consisting of representatives from both the 
53 Id. at 412.
54
 Id. 
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federal and the state level.  If that commission is charged with producing reports 
analyzing the information it has received, instead of fighting for power, state and federal 
representatives would be forced to compromise.
4. Noisy Withdrawal, Still Undecided
The “noisy withdrawal provision” which had appeared in earlier drafts of SEC’s 
rules for attorneys55 is still under review.  The first draft of this rule mandated lawyers to 
withdraw from client representation when they did not receive an appropriate response 
from the top of the company’s “ladder.”56  The lawyer would also have to disaffirm 
documents she had submitted to the SEC while representing the company, and notify the 
SEC of the withdrawal.57  The new  version of the “noisy withdrawal” provision58 that is 
currently under review abolishes the disaffirmance requirement, places the duty to report 
lawyer withdrawal on the company, and mandates withdrawal in more limited 
55
  Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposed Rule: Implementation of 
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-
8186.htm (accessed Feb.15, 2005).  The history of the “noisy withdrawal” provision, 
including it inception is discussed in New Sheriff in Corporateville at 173, n. 211. “Noisy 
withdrawal” is “one of the most contested provisions [proposed by the SEC].”  Jenny B. 
Davis, SEC Releases Final Attorney Rule, But Extends Comment Period on Noisy 
Withdrawal, 2 ABA J. eReport 4 (Jan. 31, 2003).
56 Supra, n. 55. Also, some attorneys are not qualified to judge whether response 
from the company is appropriate because litigators who do not specialize in securities 
simply lack the requisite knowledge and skills. 30 Litig. at 21-23.
57 Supra, n. 55.
58
 68 F.R. 6324 (LEXIS 2005); see Dan K. Webb & Scott Glauberman, Up the 
Ladder: Litigator Responsibilities Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 30 Litig. 21, 27 
(Summer 2004) [hereinafter Litigator Responsibilities].
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circumstances of ongoing59 or imminent fraudulent activity posing a risk of substantial 
injury to the company or to the investors.
“Noisy withdrawal,” the old and the new versions, are heavily criticized for 
infringing too much on the attorney-client privilege.60  A typical criticism goes as 
follows: “Noisy withdrawal” would “eviscerate the attorney's traditional role as advocate, 
confidant and advisor. This would drive a wedge between attorney and client. Corporate 
officers and employees would not be forthcoming and this, in and of itself, would in the 
long run hurt the corporation and its investors.”61
Another potential problem, not only with the “noisy withdrawal” provision, but 
with other parts of various new rules for lawyers, is the term “substantial injury.”  For 
example, had no one blown the whistle on Enron to this day, i.e., had the public remained 
unaware of the problems– there would have been no injury as of yet because the 
company’s stock would still be valuable so far as how the market would price it.  On the 
other hand, had the whistle been blown earlier, the inevitable injury might have been 
much less egregious. Thus, qualifying the threat of injury by the adjective “substantial” to 
59
 “Ongoing” fraud is a manipulable concept because the aftershocks of financial 
fraud linger on the market for an indefinite period of time.  Litigator Responsibilities at 
27.
60 See e.g. Christin M. Stephens, Sarbanes-Oxley and Regulation of Lawyers’ 
Conduct: Pushing the Boundaries of the Duty of Confidentiality, 24 St. Louis U. Pub. L. 
Rev. 271 (2005) [hereinafter Pushing the Boundaries]; Catharine E. Stark, Regulating 
Corporate Governance: Amended Rules of Professional Conduct Allow Lawyers to Make 
the World a More Ethical Place, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1195, 1197 (2004) [hereinafter 
Ethical Place]; Comments on Rules Implementing Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Practicing Before the SEC, 58 The 
Record 23, 25 (Winter 2003) [hereinafter Comments on Rules Implementing Section 307]; 
Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-front Assault on 
the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 Vill. L.Rev. 469 (2003). 
61 Comments on Rules Implementing Section 307 at 25.
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trigger the disclosure dissuades more timely remedial measures by attorneys with the help 
of outside agencies to which they could report misconduct.  It is at least possible that the 
very act of waiting to disclose the information and solicit assistance of the SEC in 
preventing some ongoing fraud is itself a factor contributing to the injury becoming 
substantial.
Also, it might make a big difference whether the term “substantial” is to be 
evaluated in relation to the size of companies, or in relation to the holdings of particular 
investors.  In case of the former possibility, a company worth $100 million is probably 
not “substantially” injured by fraudulent conduct decreasing its true worth by $1 million 
because the amount is a mere one percent of the overall worth.  If this company’s 
misconduct is never disclosed to the public because it is arguably insubstantial and 
therefore immaterial,62 the company’s stock prices may never be affected at all.63  If a 
disclosure about the $1 million fraud is made, however, the stock price would probably 
drop, reflecting at best a more educated judgment about the company’s true worth, or 
more likely, the worries and dissatisfaction of investors.  Even a small drop in stock 
prices of the company will still affect heavily invested shareholders of that company.  If 
one or several of these heavily invested shareholders had planned to retire using these 
investments, then any losses resulting from the decrease in the price of the company’s 
62
 Generally, what companies must disclose to the public is governed by the 
“materiality” standard set out in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  
Information is material when a reasonable investor would find it significant in the context 
of the “total mix” of information about the company available to the investor.  Id.  at 232-
233.  Materiality is a fact-sensitive determination to be examined “in light of the totality 
of the company activity.”  Id. at 238. 
63
 Scholars note that on public markets, price is not a perfect index of value.  See 
generally Theresa Gabaldon, The Story of Pinocchio: Now I’m a Real Boy, 45 B.C. L. 
Rev. 829 (2004) [hereinafter Story of Pinocchio]. 
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stock may nevertheless be “substantial” relative to those investors.  This example is based 
on the sad fate of many Enron employees who, taking this example to the extreme, 
watched their life-savings melt in the crash.64  In any event, charging the lawyer with 
predicting not only the extent of potential losses, but whom they might affect and how, 
may not be the most realistic expectation.
Another questions still unanswered is what happens when the lawyer reports 
evidence of material violations of state or federal laws and gets no response from the top 
of the “ladder.”   Under the current rules, he must resign in order to resist furthering the 
illegal conduct.  This is the classic crime-fraud prevention rule.65  But what happens 
then?  The corporation hires another law firm which either assists in the potentially 
fraudulent transaction without challenging it, or the corporation hides from its new 
representatives the information which the just-resigned counsel had informed them was 
not good, or the corporation times the market in some other way that nevertheless injures 
the interests of investors.  If the corporation does not hide information from its new 
lawyers, and the second set of lawyers also resigns upon hearing it, the corporation 
probably goes for law firm #3.66  Withdrawal, it seems, sets off a rather unpleasant cycle 
that imposes significant costs which ultimately are paid out of the shareholders’ pockets. 
Instead of attorney resignation, the SEC should mandate disclosure of improper 
conduct that is triggered by the same extremely high level of misconduct threatening 
substantial damage which applies to the resignation provision.  It seems that aside from 
64 See Anita Bernstein, The Enterprise of Liability, 39 Val. U. L. Rev. 27, 62-63 
(2004).
65
 See New Rules from the ABA, infra.
66
 Credit for this idea belongs to Professor Eleanor Myers, Temple Law School. 
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insuring lawyers do not assist in the perpetration of some fraud, the withdrawal provision 
ignores the more pressing need of getting the underlying problem solved.  Timely 
intervention of authorities with actual power to initiate injunctive proceedings or at least 
investigate the potential misconduct seems a more practical solution then a cycle of 
attorney resignations.  It should also be noted that neither the withdrawal nor this 
potential alternative of mandatory disclosure provision is likely to be used with any 
frequency, at least not any time soon.  Once again, practitioners’ reports indicate that in 
response to SOX, corporate CEOs are asking more questions, are more willing to listen to 
their lawyers, and are overall more concerned about carrying out their ethical obligations 
to the public.67  Also, only the worst kind of misconduct will trigger this kind of response 
from lawyers.  It is also questionable whether an Enron-scale violation is particularly 
deserving of the protections of the attorney-client privilege.  If the privilege reflects a 
balance between the public and the private interests, in extreme situations the balance is 
already askew.  
5. Permissive Disclosure
Under 205.3(d)(2), a reporting attorney dissatisfied with the response to her 
reporting may report confidential client information to the SEC to the extent reasonably 
necessary to prevent the occurrence of a violation that would result in either substantial 
injury to the financial or property interests of the company, or fraud perpetrated on the 
SEC, or that would rectify the fraud the attorney was involved in furthering.68  Such 
67 See Stephanie Francis Ward, A CEO’s Best Friend, 2 ABA J. eReport 43 (Oct. 
31, 2003). 
68
 SEC Release, § II. In practice, “may” will probably never be used because it 
reporting to the SEC would hurt the law firm’s business. Litigator Responsibilities  at 24-
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disclosure, although carefully circumscribed, is not mandatory.69  The SEC points out, 
however, that permissive disclosure of potentially privileged client information is 
consistent with professional responsibility rules in most states.70  The SEC also points out 
that should some states require apparently contrary rules of professional conduct, the 
more demanding state or federal regulations prevail.71  States are free to regulate their 
attorneys, but they cannot be more lax about it then the federal agency.
6. Disclosure Alternatives
As noted previously, “materiality” and “reasonableness” are terms inevitably 
requiring human judgment.72  In close cases, reasonable people inevitably will disagree.  
In order for the SEC to maintain some control over such disagreements in close cases, it 
could set up its own ethics “hotline” which attorneys could anonymously and 
confidentially contact for advice.  It is true that most, if not all big law firms have their 
own internal ethics specialists, however, these specialists are probably not also well 
versed in the intricacies of securities laws.  Because a sophisticated understanding of 
securities laws is required in order to make an appropriate judgment in close cases, it 
would perhaps best if the Commission itself takes on this responsibility.  If it is feasible 
that such a “hotline” within the SEC could operate on an anonymous basis, lawyers 
confronted with close calls may well seek ethical advice from the Commission, rather 
25.  Some bar associations explicitly endorse of this permissive provision.  See 
Comments on Rules Implementing Section 307 at 27.
69
 SEC Release, § II. 
70 Id.
71 Id.
72
 See A Note About Reasonable Time, supra.
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then from an in-firm ethicist who is not always sufficiently knowledgeable about 
securities law.  
On the other hand, Mr. Schneider says that “The last place anybody would want 
to tell something confidential is the SEC. If a lawyer wanted some independent 
verification he would be inclined to call another lawyer with a good reputation for a 
refined sense of ethics.”  Mr. Klein adds to this that the “SEC only has the power to bind 
the SEC,” and that although a confidential hotline may be helpful, lawyers have to keep 
in mind that they may not like the answers they could be getting from the Commission.   
And, Mr. Ellers cautions that although conceptually this idea might make sense, in 
practice, it will be hard to disclose just enough to get good advice, but not enough to 
identify your client.  These concerns would probably deter the use of such a hotline by 
attorneys. 
Yet, the permissive disclosure to the SEC provision of Rule 205 could also be 
adjusted in another way.  Instead of requiring attorneys contemplating or choosing to 
disclose confidential information to the agency to disclose details about the nature of 
some egregious problem,73 the rule could perhaps allow attorneys to disclose the fact of 
some intra-corporate problem, without providing further details.  The SEC, armed with 
investigatory and subpoena powers, could then initiate its own inquiry into the nature of 
the problem within a particular corporation, and prevent the lawyer from being tempted 
to act in a willfully blind manner so as to avoid accumulating enough information that 
would trigger the permissive disclosure provision.  Even if most lawyers will not act 
willfully blind, they still do not possess the kind of power that the Commission does to 
73
 Permissive disclosure is triggered only when substantial damage is threatened.  
See Permissive Disclosure, supra.
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uncover and sanction the full extent of corporate misconduct.  In cases where a lawyer 
suspects serious wrongdoing and is not receiving a satisfactory response to his concerns, 
it might be wise to enhance his options for how to solicit the help of the SEC.  Some 
critics question whether any non-mandatory reporting requirements will ever be used in
practice.74  If an attorney has more options regarding his permissive contacts with the 
Commission, however, he is at least more likely to do so. 
7. Discipline and Miscellaneous Provisions
Rule 205 notes penalties for attorneys failing to comply with these new rules.75  It 
also specifies that “good faith” compliance constitutes a complete defense.76  Rule 205 
clarifies that the fact of the attorney-client relationship is a question of federal law,77 and 
that an attorney “appearing and practicing before the Commission”78 owes ethical duties 
to the company as a whole, not to its shareholders, or individual officers or directors.79
74
 A subordinate’s livelihood depends on his relationship with the boss and news 
within the legal community travel fast. Only the most self- righteous associates will 
disclose misconduct of superiors unless they must do so.  Litigator Responsibilities at 25.
75
 SEC Release, § II.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.  An attorney representing a company-client before the SEC represents the 
company as a whole. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(a); see Comments on Rules Implementing Section 
307 at 24.  
An attorney may, however, represent individual officers or directors, and needs to 
follow traditional practice of consulting relevant conflict of interest provisions of 
professional responsibility rules in her state.  See Sean T. Carnathan, N.Y. City Bar Issues 
Opinion on Dual Representation, 30 Litig. News No. 2 (Jan., 2005).  Rule 205, on its 
face, does not address this issue.  Rules covering such representation are complex, and 
are undergoing changes. Id.  The focus of rules dealing with multiple representation is on 
informed consent. Id.  
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Also, the lawyer is not obligated to act in the “best interests” of the company, because 
judgment of company management, not its legal counsel, defines what those interests 
are.80
Under Rule 205, there is no  cause of action by private shareholders against 
attorneys.81  In fact, the reporting attorney is not required to document his reporting or the 
subsequent response,82 although she might want to do so to prove good faith compliance 
with the rules in court in the event her conduct is challenged. 
Mr. Schneider says “the truth is, there are relatively few official enforcement 
actions where the lawyer who acts in good faith is punished if he makes a bad decision.”  
Decisions made in bad faith are the primary concern, and it is pretty clear when decisions 
are made in bad faith.  “Most often, when professionals get caught, [the problem] is not 
corruption but carelessness. There are cases, [for example], when [lawyers] were 
inadequately informed, but didn’t follow up.”  Civil cases are different.  Civil plaintiffs 
have different interests and incentives. Most investor lawsuits surviving a motion to 
dismiss settle because it is “so hazardous to go to trial.”
On the other hand, Mr. Ellers claims that the Commission has been fairly 
aggressive in the past in “going after lawyers [it] doesn’t like.”
8. Subordinate Attorneys
Rule 205 addresses responsibilities of subordinate attorneys who become privy to 
evidence of material violations.  Subordinate attorneys are first to report their concerns to 
80
 SEC Release, § II.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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the supervising attorney, and go “up the ladder” of the issuer only if he reasonably 
believes the supervising attorney has failed to respond adequately.83  While seemingly 
addressing a situation when a junior attorney within a law firm reports first to his 
supervisor,84 the SEC explains that a company’s CLO is a “supervising attorney” for 
purposes of the Rule.85  Thus, this provision reiterates that in the event the CLO fails to 
respond adequately to reports of evidence of material violations of state or federal laws, 
the reporting attorney incurs the obligation to make reports further “up the ladder.”86
And again, the reporting attorney may bypass the CLO altogether and report directly to 
the QLCC, if the company has one.87
The “subordinate attorney,” however, is defined as one practicing or appearing 
before the SEC “under the supervision or direction of another attorney (other than... the 
CLO).”88  This definition may therefore apply to junior associates working under the 
supervision of senior partners of law firms retained by companies to represent them 
before the Commission.  This provision may raise a number of special liability concerns.  
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.  Some commentators deem this option impracticable.  E.g. Litigator 
Responsibilities at 25 (“even if the issuer has established a QLCC, a prudent outside 
attorney who wants to maintain the relationship with the client, and also the flow of 
business from the client, must consider whether it makes sense to report first to the 
corporation's chief legal officer (CLO), who often determines which law firms the 
corporation will hire. In-house attorneys similarly may wish to consider whether their 
careers will be damaged by going over the CLO's head.”).
88
 SEC Release, § II.
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For example, partners may be disciplined for actions of their subordinates if they fail to 
supervise them closely enough.  The D.C. Court of Appeals89 recently suspended a 
partner from practice for 30 days for an ethical violation by his subordinate involving a 
conflict of interest in representing clients before the Patent and Trademark Office.90  The 
partner in that case was not aware of violations; his suspension was predicated on a 
failure to find out about them.91
Associates also face new concerns about reporting misconduct by their seniors not 
just to the SEC, but to the local disciplinary board.92  Professional responsibility rules 
require attorneys to report conduct of their colleagues when a substantial issue of honesty 
is involved.93  The attorney making the report in this situation, however, must obtain the 
client’s informed consent if the report of the colleague’s misconduct involves privileged 
information.94  In these circumstances, the attorney-client privilege is paramount.95  What 
is unclear, however, is whether the privilege is still paramount after an associate reports 
privileged information to the SEC under provisions of Rule 205.  It is at least 
questionable that potential dishonesty by that associate’s supervisor-colleague (who did 
not respond to the associate’s concerns to trigger the requirements of Rule 205) could or 
89 In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162 (D.C. 2004).
90 See Sean T. Carnathan, Partner Sanctioned for Associate’s Errors, 30 Litig. 
News No. 3 (Mar. 2005) (discussing In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162 (D.C. 2004)). 
91 Id.
92
 Kathleen Maher, Duty Calls: Report Colleague’s Ethics Breaches Even When 
Violation Is Not a Practicing Lawyer, 91 ABA J. 28  (Feb. 2005).
93
 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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should go unreported to the local disciplinary board without the client’s consent allowing 
disclosure of privileged information which had already been disclosed to a third party, the 
SEC .  
C. New Rules from the ABA
After Congress passed Section 307 of SOX, the SEC adopted Rule 205.  The 
ABA did not lag far behind.  Perhaps as a nod to the spirit of greater watchfulness in the 
name of protecting the public from future Enrons,96 or perhaps as an attempt to take back 
its power over attorneys from an unwanted, but long coveted97 encroachment by the 
federal government,98  the ABA ratified significant changes in the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct fewer than 7 days after SOX became law.99  Whatever the 
motivation, the changes are harmonious with provisions of both Section 307 and Rule 
205.  ABA amendments to the Model Rules are addressed in greater detail elsewhere,100
but a brief overview is offered below. 
The newly amended Rule 1.6 reflects an expanded crime-fraud exception101  and 
allows attorneys to reveal client confidences “to prevent the client from committing a 
crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial 
96 See Ethical Place at 1195-1196.
97 See New Sheriff in Corporateville at 139 (noting the SEC has wished for a long 
time to impose greater gatekeeping or whistleblowing responsibilities on corporate 
attorneys).
98 Litigator Responsibilities at 26-27.
99 Litigator Responsibilities at 26.
100 E.g. Pushing the Boundaries at 271; Ethical Place at 1216-1225.
101 See Ethical Place at 1196-1197.
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interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using 
the lawyer's services.”102  A lawyer is also allowed to disclose confidential information to 
mitigate or rectify the damages of any fraud she had helped further if the damages are 
likely to be substantial.103
The changed Rule 1.3 codifies the permissive reporting of the continuance of 
illegal activity by the client.104  Unlike Rule 205, however, it does require that the 
information be related to the lawyer’s representation of the client, and retains the “best 
interests of the organization”105 phrase which the SEC has specifically cut from Rule 
205.106
If acting in “best interests” of the company is a phrase with more  restrictive 
implications than the open-ended language of Rule 205, however, and every lawyer 
practicing before the Commission is also practicing in a given state, if that state adopts 
the phrasing of the Model Rules, the intent behind the SEC’s leaving out the “best 
interests” language is essentially defeated because the Commission explicitly states the 
more restrictive, state or federal rules control.  This is just one separation of powers issue 
raised by the two-tiered system of rules for attorneys.  Also, different legal standards 
would apply to the adjudications of disputes depending on whether the suit is brought in a 
state or in a federal court.  For example, while Rule 205 uses the term “objective 
102
 Model Rules of Prof. Conduct 1.6 (2005).
103
 Id.
104
 Model Rules of Prof. Conduct 1.13 (2005).  The rule “bespeaks confusion and 
ambivalence.” Organization’s Lawyer at 80.  “May” in reality means “must.”  Id.
105
 Model Rules of Prof. Conduct 1.13.
106 See Discipline and Miscellaneous Provisions, supra. 
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evidence” to specify when the reporting obligation is triggered and when disclosure is 
permitted, most states apply an “actual knowledge” standard.107
In practice, however, Mr. Shargel and Mr. Klein agree that issues of conflict 
between state and federal rules, based on slight differences in language, have not yet 
come up, and have not yet been of great concern to attorneys.  Mr. Ellers only briefly 
notes that sometimes “the SEC creeps into [some] areas where they should not be.”
While changes in the attorney-client privilege made at the federal level are 
criticized, at least in the legal literature, as violating the traditional authority of states to 
deal with lawyers,108  the state-level initiative to promote fraud-preventing disclosures are 
criticized for encouraging lawyers to betray the trust of clients.109   Responding to 
107 See Arnold Rochvarg, Enron, Watergate and the Regulation of the Legal 
Profession, 43 Washburn L. J. 61, 79 (2003) [hereinafter Enron and Watergate] 
(comparing the response of the legal profession to the public need for better lawyers 
representing organizational clients–after Watergate and after Enron); Organization’s 
Lawyer at 72 (noting approaches taken by some state courts to attorney liability). 
108 See Litigator Responsibilities at 26-27; Susan P. Koniak, Regulating the 
Lawyer: Past Efforts and Future Possibilities: When the Hurlyburly is Done: The Bar’s 
Struggle with the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1236 (2003) (reviewing the conflict over 
authority over lawyers between the SEC and state bar organizations); see also Sara Levy, 
The SEC, The States and Attorney-Conduct Rules: An Analysis of Preemption, 32 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 1681 (2004) (discussing issues of general  federal and SEC authority to pre-empt 
state ethics rules).
109 See Ethical Place at 1197-1199; compare Keith R. Fisher, The Higher 
Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 1017 (2004) 
(discussing the need for changes in how the legal profession is regulated, lauding the 
trend to federalize legal ethics, and making additional proposals for change); Chief 
Justice Norman E. Veasey, The Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer 
for the Corporation in Responding to Fraudulent Conduct by Corporate Officers and 
Agents, 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 7-14 (2002) (discussing practical reasons it is not only 
appropriate, but necessary to at least allow lawyers to report corporate clients’ misdeeds 
without getting trapped in “intra-corporate politics”). 
“State regulation of lawyers has failed to keep pace with the increased complexity 
and geographic scope of law practice.”  Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Law Firm 
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criticisms from the states, it seems short shrift is made of the facts that most changes to 
disclosure obligations are permissive, and that lawyers are probably aware that courts 
interpret exceptions to the attorney-client privilege narrowly.110  We do not yet know 
whether lawyers will, in practice, disclose their clients’ secrets when they are not 
mandated to do so.  Mr. Klein, for example, says that faced with a choice between 
disclosing confidential information and withdrawal, he would probably prefer the latter.  
Mr. Shargel adds to this, however, that when a lawyer withdraws from representing an 
issuer, he need not provide much explanation, because at that point, everybody knows 
there is a problem.
D. Attorney Liability
In addition to the issues of attorney liability raised in sections B and C, supra, a 
few other checks on attorney conduct are worth exploring to better appreciate the special 
role attorneys play in this area of the law.  This section does not attempt to summarize 
pre-SOX standards for liability of attorneys, but rather notes the changes ushered by the 
new law. 
Structure and Choice of Law, 69 U. Cinn. L.Rev. 1161, 1161 (2001).  Multiple rules 
impose informational costs and confusion on lawyers working with multiple clients 
across state lines.  Id.  Issues related to the representation of organizational clients are 
discussed elsewhere.  See e.g. Larry P. Scriggins, Legal Ethics, Confidentiality, and the 
Organizational Client, 58 Bus. Law. 123 (2002); George C. Harris, Taking the Entity 
Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm to Organizational 
Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 597 
(Spring 1998).
110 See Ethical Place at 1206-1208.
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In 1994, in C. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,111 the Supreme 
Court rejected liability, including that of attorneys, for aiding and abetting a violation of 
securities laws.112   The case was widely criticized,113 and then overruled by statute.114
Eight years later, Judge Melinda Harmon, discussing state and federal laws in Newby v. 
Enron,115 explained the nature of securities violations:
          Market ‘manipulation and willful conduct designed 
to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially                                                  
affecting the price of securities....  The basic aim of these securities                  
antifraud provisions is to prevent rigging of the market and to permit                        
operation of the natural law of supply and demand.  The gravemen of                        
manipulation is deception of investors into believing that prices at                                   
which they purchase and sell securities are determined by the natural                                    
interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by manipulators.... Practices                              
constituting manipulation of market includes trades with controlled 
entities, fictitious trades, wash sales, prearranged matched trades, and 
painting the tape, together with lending money or securities or borrowing 
money or securities from a customer, guaranteeing any account against 
loss, entering purchase or sale orders designed to raise or lower the price 
of a security or to give the appearance of trading for purposes of inducing 
others to trade (i.e., marking the close or prearranged trading) and making 
arrangements to park any security away from the true owner.116
Lawyers, as well as other professionals, are involved at various stages of many of 
these transactions.  Judge Harmon discussed the ways to manipulate the market precisely 
111
 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
112 See Charles Murdock, The Attorney as “Creator” or “Author”: Attorney 
Liability Under Enron, 17 CBA Record 34 (Apr., 2003).
113
 Id.
114
 15 U.S.C.S. § 78t(f) (LEXIS 2005).
115
 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 569-604 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
116 Id.
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to explain that  when lawyers, or other professionals, are closely connected to the chain 
of events ultimately resulting in fraud, they too must bear responsibility for it.  Judge 
Harmon further wrote:
[i]n a complex securities fraud, there are likely to be multiple                  
violators....  Secondary actors, such as lawyers, accountants, banks                    
and underwriters, are not always shielded from [liability].... The absence              
of aiding and abetting liability [under some provisions of federal securities        
laws] does not mean that secondary actors in securities markets are always         
free from liability....  Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant,            
or bank, who employs a manipulative device... may be liable as a primary 
violator.117
Judge Harmon did not stop there.  In addition to noting that professionals 
involved in the perpetration of fraud may be held responsible as primary violators, she 
discussed other legal theories which could be used by investors against lawyers and other 
professionals.  For example, “[c]ontrolling persons liability is an alternate ground for 
liability from that of a primary violation....  The rationale for control person liability is 
that a control person is in the position to prevent the violation.”118  Also, 
professionals, including lawyers and accountants, when they take                            
the affirmative step of speaking out, whether individually or as essentially an                       
author or co-author in a  statement or report, whether identified or not,                               
about their client’s financial condition, do have a duty to third parties not                            
in privity not to knowingly or with severe recklessness issue materially                                
misleading statements on which they intent or have reason to expect that                             
those third parties will rely....  The law firm’s duty [arises] when the law firm                       
undertakes the affirmative act of communicating with investors.  Thus, although                  
the firm may not have a duty to blow the whistle on its client, once it chooses to                  
speak, a law firm does have a duty to speak truthfully, to make accurate or                          
correct material statements, even where the document does not indicate that                        
the attorney had authored it.119
117 Id. (emphasis added).
118 Id.
119 Id. (emphasis added).
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Judge Harmon’s decision has been cited in over five dozen law review articles, 
thirteen treatises, and even an ALR annotation.120  The language used in this case opens 
up a broad range of potential liability theories asserted in courts against attorneys.  Even 
if Rule 205 explicitly bars a private cause of action against attorneys,121 Newby may 
altogether drown out that provision. After all, Rule 205 is a federal regulation and 
shareholders could avoid its ban on private suits against lawyers by filing Newby-inspired 
claims in state courts.
In addition to possible suits by private shareholders under Newby, if not Rule 205, 
the general augmentation of the SEC’s powers pursuant to SOX may mean a continued 
expansion in the area of attorney liability in the future.  Under Rule 205, for example, the 
SEC sets out new standards for disciplining and sanctioning attorneys practicing before 
it,122 but there is no indication the SEC will stop there.  After all, the Commission is still 
considering some provisions regulating attorney conduct, such as “noisy withdrawal.” 
120
 Shepards report, LEXIS (last updated February 15, 2005).
121
 17 C.F.R. § 205.7. 
122
 17 C.F.R. § 205.6.  Recent reports also suggest that the SEC is reviving some 
old and dormant provisions of federal securities laws to combat the problem of corporate 
fraud.  Report of the Task Force On Exchange Act Section 21(a) Written Statements, 59 
Bus. Law 531, (2004).  The SEC has recently resurrected a generally ignored regulation 
authorizing it to require companies to make certain disclosures about matters investigated 
by the Commission.  Id.  For a summary discussion of criminal prosecutions of financial 
crimes, see Reforming Corporations. 
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II. WHY ALL THESE REFORMS ALL OF A SUDDEN? SOME DETAILS ON THE 
HISTORY THAT HAD PROMPTED THE REFORMS.
The SEC’s rules regulating attorney conduct signal that despite efforts to resist the 
restructuring of attorney-corporate client relationships, attorneys, like auditors and other 
corporate outsiders, will also have to assume greater gate-keeping responsibilities.  The 
roles of attorneys as gatekeepers and as liable bearers of some of the windfall of 
corporate malfeasance are topics hotly debated in the legal literature.123
Most commentators writing about SOX, corporate reforms, and the new rules for 
lawyers begin their discussions with an overview of the root causes of Enron, the 
quintessential example of everything that went wrong.  One pair of authors points out that 
SOX is unusual in that it doesn’t have a legislative history; the downfall of Enron and 
discussions about what had caused it are the history of the law.124  For this reason, the 
paper discusses Enron in the section below.
A. The Downfall of Enron
Although the examination of factors, including the failures of lawyers, that had 
brought down Enron might be hindered by hindsight, it is equally hindering not to try to 
learn from the past.  A long list of theories have been put forward125 to explain how a 
123 E.g. Crisis in Confidence; Enron and Watergate;  Steven K. Hazen & Nancy 
H. Worjtas, Confidentiality of Attorney-Client Relationship, SEC Rule 205 and State Bar 
Issues: A Summary Report, 15 ABA Prof. Law. 24 (Spring 2004).
124
 Thomas Gorman & Heather Stewart, New Sheriff in Corporateville at 141, 
145. 
125
 Everyone is fascinated by Enron.  E.g.; Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The 
Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (Portfolio, 
2004) [hereinafter Smartest Guys] (a thorough overview of what went wrong and who 
was involved); Nancy B. Rapoport & Bela G. Dharan, Enron: Corporate Fiascos and 
Their Implications (Foundation Press, 2004) [hereinafter Corporate Fiascos] (collection 
of essays by various authors);  Mini Schwartz & Sherron Watkins, Power Failure
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company named by Fortune Magazine as “The Most Innovative Company in America” 
for six years in a row, a company once the 6th largest capitalization machine in the 
world,126 a company paying its secretaries $600,000 a year,127 a company watched by 
millions of people from all sorts of perspectives,  could, in a few short months since its 
sublimity, state a loss of over a billion dollars in shareholders’ money128 and end up in 
Chapter 11 courts (among others).129  But, alas, it did happen, and at one point when 
Enron’s executives were making a PowerPoint presentation recounting recent events, “a 
complete loss of investor and creditor confidence” was one of those points.130
While most explanations offered to explain Enron’s demise are economic,131
some are behavioral.132  Whatever the nature of the explanation, the causes of the Enron 
debacle could be classified into proximate and ultimate ones. 
(Doubleday, 2003) [hereinafter Power Failure] (personalized stories of Enron’s 
executives).
126
 Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How 
Enron’s Public Image Morphed from the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to 
the Most Notorious Company Ever, in Corporate Fiascos [hereinafter Dr. Jekyll & Mr. 
Skilling]; Reforming Corporations at 398-399.
127 Power Failure at 223.
128 Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: Reforming Corporations at 398-399.
129
 Enron was the biggest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history, Bombing Markets at 
1579, until Worldcom filed.  Crisis in Confidence at 1223 n. 56.
130 Power Failure, 336.  Enron’s 1998 Annual Report read: “EXCELLENCE:... 
The great fun here will be for all of us to discover just how good we can really be.” 
Smartest Guys, xix.  Enron’s 2001 Annual Report read, on the cover page: “In Volatile 
Markets, Everything Changes But Us!”; Bombing Markets at 1584-1585.
131 E.g. Matthew J. Barrett, Enron and Andersen–What Went Wrong and Why 
Similar Audit Failures Could Happen Again, in Corporate Fiascos;  John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding Enron, “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, in Corporate Fiascos; Bala 
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One proximate reason Enron earned its name as an innovator is because many of 
its transactions were unique, but also legal, at least initially.133  At the time Enron began 
setting up its “special purpose entities” (SPEs) no one could yet call them a fraud.  
Setting up SPEs is a legal method of isolating a particularly risky aspect of a business and 
a means of raising revenue.134  It works in the following manner:   A company sets up an 
independently-managed subsidiary and sells to it some aspect of its business associated 
with a particular risk.  A real estate company, for example, could sell off one of its 
buildings. The subsidiary company, this so-called SPE, borrows the money to pay for this 
purchase using the cash flow of the business (building) itself as collateral for the loan.  
The result is money for the parent company and a decrease in its risk profile: if running 
that building was a particularly risky business, then it is no longer managed by the parent.  
Technically, Enron did not manage its SPEs.  It was its Chief Financial Officer, Andrew 
Fastow, who did. This distinction is one without a difference, however, and the result was 
lack of independence between the parent and the subsidiary, which was illegal.135
G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and Key 
Financial Measures, in Corporate Fiascos.
132 E.g. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron, It’s About the Gatekeepers, 
Stupid, in Corporate Fiascos; Lynne Dallas, Enron and Ethical Corporate Climates, in 
Corporate Fiascos; Bombing Markets at 1616; Robert Prentice, Whither Securities 
Regulation? Some Behavioral Observartions Regarding Proposals for its Failure, 51 
Duke L. J. 1397 (2002) [hereinafter Behavioral Observations].
133 See Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron–The Primer, in Corporate Fiascos; Bala G. 
Dharan, Enron’s Accounting Issues: What Can We Learn to Prevent Future Enrons? in 
Corporate Fiascos; Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and Key Financial 
Measures, in Corporate Fiascos.
134 Supra, n. 133.
135 Supra, n. 133.
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Enron’s SPEs were named after Star Wars characters like Chewco, or Jedi.136
That is not the only thing that made them truly special, however.  Instead of selling some 
aspect of its business to many of its SPEs, Enron sold its own stock.  Theoretically, a 
company’s stock is only as good as the underlying business, but in Enron’s case the stock 
was the business right until its massive implosion.  From an accounting standpoint, the 
stock, called “shareholder equity” belongs on the liabilities half of the balance sheet.  At 
the end of the day, liabilities must equal the assets, so when some stock is sold to the 
SPE, the liability is written off and payment received is added to the assets,  making the 
day’s activities look good.  As far as unsubstantiated paper transactions go, Arthur 
Andersen, the infamous accounting firm which had audited Enron and is now preparing 
to defend its choices in front of the Supreme Court,137 is rumored to have destroyed two 
metric tons of paper related to its dealings with Enron.138  And, this was in the age of 
email, with less paper generated and maintained then in the past. 
So many SPEs were set up that what was left of Enron became an investment 
opportunity with extremely low risk.  This, coupled with another innovation– forgetting 
to restate projected earnings when they didn’t materialize–made Enron very attractive, 
albeit in a very superficial way.  But that, apparently, was good enough.139
136 Reforming Corporations at 398-399.
137
 David G. Savage, On Motives and Memos, 91 ABA J. 14 (April 2005). 
138
 Id.
139 Supra n. 133.
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An alternative explanations of Enron’s downfall is the market bubble theory.140  A 
bubble is a sort of anomaly, an exception to the way markets do or should generally 
function.141  Keywords used to describe the causes of bubbles are euphoria, exuberance, 
and irrationality.142  Things were going well, there was a boom, and people just lost their 
heads, expecting growth, success, and prosperity in light of  innovation and growth which 
had just happened, rather then basing expectations on new  information and relevant 
financial forecasts.143
But it was not just the people’s fault.  Analysts and professional advisors also got 
sloppy, and some were plainly dishonest.144  Many investment advisors received 
commissioned pay, and this led them to be extra friendly to their customers.145
Essentially, people were led on to overinvest.146  As one commentator put it:
[o]ver generations, Americans have been extraordinarily adroit at 
adjusting themselves to inequalities perceived to arise from the "fair" 
accidents of capitalism, as mentioned previously. Most workers can 
adjust themselves, psycho-socially, to financial losses they perceive to 
result from bad luck, their own miscalculations, or their "preference" for 
leisure-as well as gains accruing to others through good fortune or as a 
result of such persons' diligence or acumen.147
140 E.g. Daniel J. Morissey, After the Ball is Over: Investor Remedies in the Wake 
of the Dot-Com Crash and Recent Corporate Scandals, 83 Neb. L. Rev. 732 (2005) 
[hereinafter After the Ball]; Understanding Enron, It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 
135-136 in Corporate Fiascos.
141 Supra, n. 140.
142 Supra n. 140.
143 Supra n. 140.
144 After the Ball at 732-739.
145 Id.
146 Id; see Behavioral Observations; Gatekeeping Failure.
147 Bombing Markets at 1636.
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Sometimes there is bad luck, but sometimes, like before a bubble bursts, it looks as if 
luck is very good. 
The stock-option compensation scheme for corporate managers implemented in 
the 1990s is yet another, psychological way of understanding the mechanics of Enron’s 
collapse.  One basic attribute of a corporation is separation between its ownership by 
shareholders and its control by managers.148  The wealth-maximizing advantages of this 
separation are manifold, including better-qualified managers, increased incentives for 
risk- taking that generate bigger rewards, and easier capitalization.149   The main cost is a 
conflict of interest between managers and owners.150  The typical way to deal with this 
conflict is to monitor managers and impose fiduciary duties,151 but this, apparently was 
not enough.  Stock options were a direct way to realign interests of managers with those 
of shareholders, by giving them a share of company ownership if the company performs 
really well.152
148 See Corporations, § 2.04.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151
 Id.
152 See Story of Pinocchio at 849. “[This] method of alignment is based on a 
common interest in steadily increasing stock prices.”  Id.  A focus on shareholders in 
corporate law is counterproductive and inappropriate.  Id.  Shareholders in corporate law 
are cows which must be slaughtered.  Id.
Recently, some companies are changing using stock options as means of 
compensating employees.  See e.g. Eric Dash, Time Warner Stops Granting Stock 
Options to Most of Staff, N.Y. Times C1 (Feb. 19, 2005) (WL 2519322).  
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As Professor John Coffee, Jr.153 describes, this compensation scheme was 
accompanied by unforseen consequences.  It created an irresistable incentive for 
managers to keep up the faces of the balance sheets, whether or not there was substantive 
company growth to support it.154  It was not just that individual managers were personally 
greedy for stock-option bonuses; the problem was that all of them became that way at the 
same time.  Manager of company X had to keep up with manager of company Y to get 
the same bonus for himself, and then attract enough investors for the company to ensure 
sufficient capital influx. The reasoning was that unless investors saw the pretty balance 
sheets, the company would not sell stock and get the cash it needed to implement the 
reforms with actual  substance.  So, while the keeping up with the Jones’ syndrome, 
known in economics as “herding behavior,”155 may well have been spurned by selfish 
motives of self-profit, the stock-option compensation scheme quickly became a game of 
survival for any corporation that had adopted it.156
For purposes of short-term gains, the company’s face on the market matters a 
great deal to investors for several reasons.  One reason is the above-noted need to attract 
investors.  Although over half of Enron’s shareholders were sophisticated investment 
funds,157 no amount of expertise had sufficed to anticipate that growth reflected on 
153 Gatekeeper Failure.
154 Id. at 304.  “As executive compensation shifted to being equity-based, instead 
of cash-based, a greatly enhanced incentive arose for managers to manipulate earnings -
and to induce their gatekeepers to let them.”  Id.  The few European companies who had 
adopted similar schemes–ended up in similar disasters.  Id.
155 Id. at 329.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 329.
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companies’ financials might not be grounded in reality given this pressure to perform and 
show off.158  The second reason is herding behavior among the larger, more sophisticated 
investors and analysts themselves.159  Even if some of them had noticed the warning 
signs,160 fund managers had so-called “careerist” reasons to go along with the popular 
consensus about everything going well and good.  It may well have been that any number 
of smart and sophisticated funds and analysts did indeed pick up on the shadiness of 
Enron’s dealings at the time when its image was still bulletproof.161  However, the 
problem was that the wise man who calls that the emperor has no clothes – will quickly 
have no friends whose coalition of an opinion does not like to be challenged.  In a world 
where networking is key to professional survival, applauding financial fashion trends no 
matter how bad they may be, these so-called “careerist” reasons can assume very sharp 
significance.162
So, maybe it was a bubble.  Maybe it was the fault of irrational, unsatisfied 
investors.  Maybe it was the greed of irrational, unsatisfied managers and brokers.  What 
commentators do agree on is that Enron put a big question mark next to the notion of 
American markets always being the best in the world.163  Beyond the technicalities of 
158 Id.
159
 Id. 
160
 “In fact, some very high-profile investors stayed away from Enron stock 
because Enron’s financial statements were simply not making sense.” Dr. Jekyll & Mr. 
Skilling, at 78, n. 4. 
161
 Id.
162 Gatekeeper Failure.
163 Reforming Corporations at 394.
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how Enron may have fallen, scholars would also probably  agree with Professor Coffee’s 
notion that the ultimate issue underlying recent corporate disasters was an unbalanced 
incentive structure for behavior by actors inside and outside of the corporation.164
Where were the lawyers?
Gatekeepers are “reputational intermediaries who provide verification and 
certification services to investors.”165  The incentives for gatekeepers to lie are much 
more limited than they are for corporate actors engaged in company or self promotion.166
But presumably because of herding, networking, irrationality, solidarity, competition for 
corporate clients, or even bribes, Professors Coffee and Robert Prentice point out that 
gatekeepers in the late 1990s and early 2000s have aligned themselves not with investors 
to whom they represent the trustworthiness of their clients, but with the clients 
themselves.167  It is perhaps for this reason that the vast majority of SOX is dedicated to 
reinforcing the independence of corporate directors, fraud-investigating committees, 
auditors, and lawyers.  The public relies on a multi-tiered system of checks on the self-
interest of corporate managers, which is probably the most limiting aspect of how a 
corporation works.  Independence of these checks is the key to their effectiveness.168
164
  Gatekeeper Failure.
165 Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 127 in Corporate 
Fiascos. 
166 Id.
167 Id; Behavioral Observations (also sharply criticizing absence of regulation and 
investor self-protection (contractarian view) as the proper remedies for market 
malfunctions).
168 Gatekeeper Failure at 330-331.
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As far as their gatekeeping function, however, lawyers are in a rather precarious 
position. Traditionally, their primary duties are not to the public, but to their clients, 
although Harvey Pitt may disagree.169  But, this is exactly why Section 307 and Rule 205 
have drawn such sharp criticism for their eroding effects on the attorney-client 
privilege.170  After all, attorneys are hired by clients to help clients; arguably, any “duty 
to the public” lawyers might owe is only a side effect of what their clients do. 
CONCLUSION
When financial crimes jump into public focus, one might expect a public desire 
for vengeance and retribution to befall anybody and everybody, including lawyers who 
had not exactly enjoyed high public esteem in the first place.  On the other hand, financial 
crimes of the few recent years have profoundly affected not only the well-being of many 
families, but the framework through which traditional obligations of attorneys are 
examined.  SOX and the variety of new rules and regulations aim to protect the public 
from fraud, and attorneys, like other professionals, are strongly affected.  
New rules for attorneys are criticized for eroding the attorney-client privilege.171
However, it is important to remember that the attorney-client privilege is a continuum.  
Recent history perhaps counsels moving the balance a little more toward public 
disclosure of corporate secrets as an antidote to corporate fraud.172
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Judge Harmon in Newby173 quoted the language of the 73rd Congress, which had 
passed the Securities Act of 1934.  “There cannot be honest markets without honest 
publicity.  Manipulation and dishonest practices of the marketplace thrive upon mystery 
and secrecy.”174  Also, in the words of Justice Louis Brandeis, “sunlight... is the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”175  Because many provisions of 
SOX are aimed at improving the disclosure of various kinds of information, transparency 
remains a big concern today.  Hopefully, SOX and the rules and regulations that followed 
it have institutionalized enough transparency in the corporate world to prevent future 
disasters of the size of Enron. 
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